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De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua" An
Extension of the Restrictive Theory of Foreign
Sovereign Immunity
Recognizing that American citizens increasingly are coming into
contact with foreign states,1 Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762 (hereinafter "FSIA" or "the Act"). The purpose of
the Act is twofold. First, to provide when and how a lawsuit can be
maintained against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the
United States. Second, to specify the circumstances under which a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity.3 In De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua 4 (hereinafter "Sanchez") the defendant's motion to
dismiss forced a Federal court in Louisana to interpret the substantive
provisions of the FSIA. The issue in Sanchez centered upon whether certain actions of the central bank of Nicaragua fell within the FSIA's general grant of sovereign immunity 5, or whether such actions were within
one of the Act's exceptions to sovereign immunity. 6 The court held that,
regardless of their "governmental" rather than "commercial" character,
the actions of the foreign bank were encompassed by two exceptions to
the grant of sovereign immunity and that, therefore, jurisdiction was
properly based in the American courts. 7 The decision furnishes an important judicial interpretation of the terms "commercial" and "governmental" as they pertain to the immunity provisions of the Act.
Moreover, the decision is illustrative of the difference between the jurisdictional reaches of the FSIA and the restrictive theory of immunity that
the FSIA was meant to codify.
On July 12, 1979 Ms. Josefina Najarro de Sanchez sought to redeem
a certificate of deposit in the amount of $150,000 with Banco Nacional
de Nicaragua ("Banco Nacional"), a commercial bank in Nicaragua.
Having insufficient American dollars on hand, Banco Nacional reI H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as House Report].
2 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (3), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1601-1611 (1976)).
3 House Report, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6604.
4 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981).
5 Id. at 901. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
6 515 F. Supp. at 902. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(1976).
7 515 F. Supp. at 914.
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quested the dollars from the defendant, Banco Central de Nicaragua
("Banco Central"), with which it held an account. Banco Central issued
a check to the plaintiff, Sanchez, for $150,000 drawn on Banco Central's
account with the Citizens & Southern International Bank (C&S) in the
United States and debited Banco Nacional's account for the equivalent
in Nicaraguan Cordobas. Sanchez then left for the United States during
the Nicaraguan civil war. The Nicaraguan civil war ultimately resulted
in the ouster of the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle.8
On July 17, 1979, Sanchez presented the check to the C&S branch
in New Orleans but was refused payment. Although only a few days had
passed since Sanchez left Nicaragua, the government had changed hands
and a revolutionary junta had been installed. C&S ultimately informed
Sanchez that the new president of Banco Central had instructed it to
stop all payments from the C&S account. Banco Central continued to
refuse payment at the time of the suit. 9
Sanchez brought an action against Banco Central for breach of the
duty to honor the check, breach of contract, misrepresentation, and conversion.' 0 Jurisdiction over Banco Central was based upon the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. Banco Central claimed immunity and filed a
motion to dismiss.
The FSIA extends a general grant of immunity to a foreign state,
but also creates exceptions under which the district courts have jurisdiction over certain activities of the foreign state." The district court in
Sanchez examined the activity of Banco Central and determined it to be
"governmental" rather than "commercial" in nature, thereby precluding
jurisdiction based on the "commercial activities" exception to sovereign
immunity. The court held, however, that Banco Central's actions fell
within the exception concerning property taken in violation of international law 12 as well as the exception relating to the noncommercial torts
3
of the foreign state.'
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first recognized by the
American courts in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon in 1812.14 There,
the Supreme Court upheld a plea of immunity, supported by an executive branch suggestion, as consistent with the law and practices of nations. 15 In the early part of this century, the American courts began to
rely upon and treat as conclusive the immunity determinations of the
8

Id. at 901.

9 Id.

10 Sanchez also asserted claims against C&S for breach of duty to honor the check, misrepresentation, and negligence. These claims were not the subject of the motion before the court.
Id. at 903 n.2.
II See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (listing commercial and other exceptions to general sovereign immunity).
12 515 F. Supp. at 910-12. See infra notes 66, 67 and accompanying text.
13 Id. at 912-14. See infra notes 73, 78 and accompanying text.
14 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
15 Id. at 145-46.
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State Department. 16 This practice reached its zenith in Ex Parle Republic
of Peru1 7 in which the Supreme Court declared it the "duty" of the judiciary to accept and follow the executive's determination of sovereign immunity.18 In Repubhc of Mexico v. Hoffman 19 the Court stated: "It is,
therefore, not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government
has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
20
government has not seen fit to recognize."
In an effort to clarify its position on sovereign immunity and to
bring the immunity determinations of the United States into conformity
with other nations, the State Department adopted the restrictive theory
of immunity in the Tate letter. 2 1 Under the restrictive theory, a foreign
state is entitled to immunity for its public acts, but not for its private or
commercial acts.2 2 Prior to this time, the United States fdllowed the
classical or absolute theory of immunity under which a sovereign must
consent in order to be made defendant in the courts of another country
23
regardless of the nature of the act in question.
Recognizing that governments were engaging in commercial activities with greater frequency, the State Department felt it necessary to
adopt the restrictive theory to insure that the rights of persons doing
business with a foreign government would be determined by U.S.
courts.2 4 For the period subsequent to the Tate letter, U.S. courts continued to defer to the immunity determinations of the State
25
Department.
However, the position taken by U.S. courts created a number of difficulties. First, the State Department was not structured to take evidence, hear witnesses, or afford appellate review of its immunity
determinations. 26 Second, foreign states were left with the initiative to
decide which sovereign immunity determinations they would take before
the State Department, as well as determining when to exert diplomatic
and political influences. The strong pull of diplomatic and political influence made it difficult for the State Department to apply the doctrine
of the Tate letter consistently. 27 Last, the courts found themselves
16 House Report, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News at 6606.
17318 U.S. 578 (1943).
18 Id. at 588-89.
19 324 U.S. 30 (1944).
20 Id. at 35.

21 Letter from State Dep't Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Phillip
B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep't St. Bull. 984 (1952).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 985.
25 See Victory Transp., Inc., v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964) (formulating a test for determining whether an act is public or private and commercial, absent any
official State Department Communication), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
26 House Report, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6607.
27 Id.
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outside the mainstream of international law, because virtually every
other country considered the question of sovereign immunity as one for
28
the courts, and not the executive branch to decide.
In response to these problems, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.29 Its purpose was to "provide when and
how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities
in the courts of the United States and to provide when a foreign state is
entitled to sovereign immunity. '30 The purpose of the FSIA is to codify
the restrictive theory3' and to insure its application in U.S. courts by
transferring the determinations of sovereign immunity from the .executive branch to the judiciary; thereby assuring that immunity decisions
will not be subject to political or diplomatic pressures. 32 The Act also
makes it clear that it is the "sole and exclusive standard" for the resolu33
tion of sovereign immunity decisions.
The FSIA grants to the district courts original jurisdiction, without
regard for amount in controversy, over any in personam nonjury civil action against a foreign state 34 in which it is determined that the foreign
state is not entitled to immunity. 35 Section 1604 of the Act sets forth the

general grant of immunity to a foreign state from the jurisdiction of the
U.S. courts,36 subject to certain exceptions within the act. 3 7 Congress

clearly contemplated that the requirements of minimum contacts and
adequate notice be observed. 38 The claim of immunity is an affirmative
defense which must be specially pleaded and when it is utilized the bur28 Id. at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6608.
29 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, supra note 2.
30 House Report, supra note 1, at 6, reprinted in 1976 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6604.
31 Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6605.
32 Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6605-06.
33 Id. at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6610. For a further discussion of the development of sovereign immunity, see Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 33, 36-43 (1978).
34 A "foreign state" is defined within the statute to include "a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). A central bank, such as Banco Central, is considered an "agent or
instrumentality" of a foreign state. House Report supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6614.
35 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976), provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 16051607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
36 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976), provides:
Subject to existing international agreement to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
37 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1976).
38 House Report, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6612.
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den of proof lies with the foreign state to support its claim of immunity. 39
The court in Sanchez focused on the interpretation of three pertinent
40
exceptions to the foreign state's immunity:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
United States or of the States in any case-...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged
for such property is present in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged
for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States;
(5)

(B)

not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign
state while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to- . . .
any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with con41
tract rights.

Since these exceptions are phrased as substantive acts committed by

a foreign state, a "court faced with a claim of immunity from jurisdiction
must engage ultimately in a close examination of the underlying cause of
action in order to decide whether the plaintiff may obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant. ' 4 2 This required the court in Sanchez to examine the
issuance of the check by Banco Central to Sanchez, to determine if it fell
43
within one of the three applicable exceptions.
39 Id. at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6616.
40 Two other possible exceptions under section 1605 are those involving waiver of immunity and property acquired by gift or succession. Foreign Sovereign Immunites Act § 4(a), 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)(4) (1976). Neither were alleged to be applicable to the facts before the
court.
41 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), (3), (5), (5)(B)
(1976).
42 Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43 The court never addressed the issue of whether the existence of a foreign plaintiff, Ms.
Sanchez, affected the court's jurisdiction under the FSIA. While the Act was aimed primarily
at contacts between American citizens and foreign states, nowhere does the statute expressly
allow or preclude a suit brought by a foreign citizen. Only four days prior to the decision in
Sanchez, the Second Circuit had determined:
Congress formed no clear intent as to the citizenship of plaintiffs under the Act.
It probably did not even consider the question. In the absence of determinative-
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As set out above, section 1605(a)(2) establishes three exceptions to a
foreign state's immunity based upon the commercial activities of the foreign state. Jurisdiction under this section can be exercised only upon a
finding that the foreign state engaged in some type of commercial activity and that the suit is based upon that activity. With this in mind, the
court in Sanchez centered its discussion of section 1605(a)(2) on whether
the actions of Banco Central were "commercial" or "governmental" in
nature.

44

'45
Although the FSIA contains a definition of "commercial activity,
this definition is broadly worded and, therefore, the courts are given a
great deal of latitude in determining whether the act in question is a
commercial act. 46 Section 1603(d) defines a "commercial activity" as
either "a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. '4 7 In
sum, the purpose of the activity is irrelevant; it is the nature of the activ-

ity that is critical.

48

In Sanchez, the act which formed the basis of the suit was the issuance of the check by Banco Central to Sanchez. The court determined
that the nature of this act was governmental not commercial and, therefore, no basis for jurisdiction existed under section 1605(a)(2). 49 Relying
primarily 'on sworn statements of Banco Central officials, the court reaor even persuasive-guidance from the legislative history, the words of the statute
control. Section 1330(a) is not limited to suits brought by Americans. It applies
to 'any nonjury civil action against a foreign state' (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we hold that a suit brought in a federal court by an alien against a
foreign state is properly filed-at least under the terms of the Act.
Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1981). In Ver/tnden, however,
the court went on to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 330. While
a foreign plaintiff could bring an action under section 1330 of the FSIA, the court noted that
jurisdiction could only exist if the action was also within either the diversity or federal question
jurisdiction which the Constitution grants to the courts in Article III. Id. at 325. Any action
outside of this jurisdictional grant would be beyond the court's constitutional power to decide.
In Ver/inden, the applicable law was the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits of the International Chamber of Commerce or New York law, not federal law, and therefore,
no federal question existed. Id. at 326. Since both the plaintiff and the defendant were foreigners, no diversity existed either. Id. at 325. Consequently, the action was beyond the court's
powers.
In Sanchez, however, an American, C&S bank, was also a named defendant. This fact,
while not discussed by the court, would bring the case within the court's constitutional grant to
hear cases between "a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. Hence, the action brought by Sanchez fell within both the legislative and
Constitutional grants of jurisdiction.
44 See 515F. Supp. at 903-10.
45 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
46 House Report, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6615.
47 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
48 House Report, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6615.
49 515 F. Supp. at 907.
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soned that the issuance of the check to Sanchez was performed only in
the interests of maintaining foreign exchange rates; 50 that Banco Central
was obligated to issue the check under Nicaraguan law; 51 and that Banco
Central's role "was no different than the role any government plays in
facilitating business transactions between its citizens though regulation
'5 2
or licensing."
Prior decisions interpreting the meaning of a "commercial activity"
support the holding in Sanchez. In Yessenin- Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency,5
the district court for the southern district of New York faced the issue of
whether the allegedly libelous publications of two Soviet press agencies
fell within the commercial activities exception to immunity under section
1605(a)(2). The court held that the inquiry must focus on Whether the
specific activity at issue was a commercial act of a foreign state or
whether it is governmental in nature. 54 The general commercial or governmental nature of the foreign entity is not dispositive of the issue since
the Act contemplates that a given entity may engage in commercial activities at times and in governmental activities at other times. 55 In Yessenin, the court concluded that the acts were not done in connection with
any commercial activity, but rather were part of the "intra-governmental
56
Put
cooperation" in which these press agencies often participated.
more simply, although the press agencies engaged in commercial activities at times (and perhaps even a majority of the time), the particular act
complained of was done solely to aid the Soviet government and must be
regarded as the official commentary of that government. Consequently,
the acts were "governmental" in nature and, therefore, entitled the defendants to immunity under section 1605(a)(2). Similarly, in Arango v.
Guzman Travel Adivsors Corp. ,57 the Fifth Circuit determined that certain
acts of an airline, wholly-owned by the government, were entitled to immunity because the defendant had been impressed into duty pursuant to
the laws of that country and was, therefore, acting merely as an "arm or
agent" of the government in carrying out this role. 58 Again, the court
emphasized that the general commercial or governmental nature of the
defendant is not at issue. Rather, the focus is on whether the particular
conduct in question "actually constitutes or is in connection with com'5 9
mercial activity."
Finally, in Carey v. National Oil Corp. ,6 an action was brought against
50 Id. at 909.
51 See id. at 910.
52 Id.

53 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
54 Id. at 855.

55 Id.
56 Id. at 856.
57 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
58 Id. at 1379.
59 Id.

60 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aftd, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
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the nation of Libya for inducing its oil companies to breach contracts
with other oil companies. Libya had ordered a reduction in oil production and an embargo of certain oil shipments during the Yom Kippur
War. The district court for the southern district of New York held that
Libya was immune from suit because it was "beyond cavil that these
actions by Libya were no part of a commercial undertaking; rather, they
were deliberate weapons of foreign policy, aimed at influencing the con'6 1
duct of other nations, or at least punishing undesirable conduct."
The decision in Sanchez is consistent with these prior decisions.
Banco Central, regardless of its commercial or governmental character,
acted under a legal obligation to supply dollars to Nicaraguan banks.
The check was issued as part of Banco Central's role as an "arm or
agent" of the Nicaraguan government. The dollars were supplied with
no mercantile interest in mind. It was part of the inter-governmental
cooperation in which Banco Central participated. Being governmental
in nature, these acts fell outside the jurisdictional grasp of section
1605(a) (2). While on the surface the issuance of a check by a bank would
appear to be a commercial transaction, the facts underlying Banco Central's actions indicate that, in this particular instance, the actions were
governmental in nature. The national civil war and dwindling supplies
of foreign currencies forced the government of Nicaragua to protect the
nation's wealth by controlling the flow of dollars. Banco Central was
merely the instrumentality used to carry out that policy decision.
Other actions of a central bank, however, have been held commercial in nature and, therefore, within the exceptions of section 1605(a)(2).
In Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. FederalRepubhc of Nigeria,62 the central bank of Nigeria was charged with breach of a letter of credit. The
letter of credit was established as part of an agreement on the part of
Nigeria to purchase cement from the defendant. Although the breach
occurred in the face of a national economic disaster, 63 the Second Circuit
held that the bank was subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts
because the activity upon which the suit was based, the issuance of the
letter of credit, arose out of a commercial activity. The court stated that
"if the activity is one in which a private person could engage, it is not
61
62
63
twenty

453 F. Supp. at 1102.
500 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1980).
In the spring of 1975, the Republic of Nigeria contracted with 68 suppliers to purchase
million metric tons of cement to be delivered in one year to the port of Lagos. Payment

was to made through a letter of credit established by the Central Bank of Nigeria with a New

York bank in favor of the supplier. Within months, the port became congested with ships delivering the cement and delivery of vital consumer goods was threatened. Demurrage claims rose
dramatically as ships waited to unload. Facing an economic crisis, Nigeria placed an embargo
on all shipping into the port and ordered the Central Bank to alter the terms of the letters of
credit. See Nat'l Am. Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). These facts have given rise to a number of suits under the
FSIA. See, e.g., Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd,
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
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entitled to immunity.)

64

The stop payment order in Sanchez is similar to the breach in Texas
Trading in that both were part of a governmental response to a potential
economic disaster. Yet the results are different. This is because the act
which formed the basis of the action in Texas Trading was commercial in
nature while in Sanchez the act was governmental in nature, that is, an
act which a private person could not have engaged in.
In Sanchez the issuance of the check was part of the procedure developed by the Nicaraguan government to regulate the flow of money and
to maintain a constant foreign exchange rate. The regulation of monetary funds during a time of social unrest is an action in which only a
sovereign may engage. As the court in Sanchez points out, while Banco
Central's act was a necessary part of a commercial activity between
Banco Nacional and Sanchez, it was not of itself performed as part of
any commercial function. Banco Central's role was "no different than
the role any government plays in facilitating business transactions be' 65
tween its citizens through regulation or licensing."
There remained, however, the possibility that jurisdiction might be
based upon two other exceptions to the general grant of immunity. Section 1605(a)(3) relates to property taken in violation of international
law. 66 For jurisdiction to exist under this section, the property taken
must be either (1) present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on by the foreign state in this country or
(2) owned by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state which is
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.6 7 In light of the
finding that Banco Central's use of the C&S account to regulate foreign
currency exchanges was governmental and not commercial, jurisdiction
could not be based upon the first exception.
However, the legislative history makes it clear that under the second
exception, unlike the requirements of section 1605(a)(2), the property
need not be present in connection with a commercial activity of the
agency or instrumentality. 68 Therefore, the Sanchez court concluded,

"[I]f Banco Central conducts commercial activities in the United States,
it may be sued on a theory of confiscation in violation of international
64 647 F.2d at 309.
65 515 F. Supp. at 910. For a further discussion of the "commercial" versus "governmental" dichotomy, see Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1031-35 (1979).
66 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976). The term
"taken in violation of international law" includes the nationalization or expropriation of property without prompt adequate and effective consideration and takings which are arbitrary or
discriminatory in nature. House Report, supra note 1, at 19-20, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6618.
67 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976). In addition,
any property exchanged for property owned by a foreign state or by its agency or instrumentality can serve as a basis for jurisdiction, Id.
68 House Report, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6618.
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law even though the dollars for which Sanchez's certificate of deposit was
exchanged are not held in connection with such commercial activities.
The legislative history and the plain meaning of the statute support
the court's conclusion that this second exception requires only a finding
that the foreign agency be engaged in any commercial activity within the
U.S., regardless of its relationship to the acts giving rise to the action.
Unlike section 1605(a)(2), this exception does not limit the court's inquiry to the act at issue. Rather it allows the court to examine a/ of the
foreign agency's activities and contacts with the United States in order to
determine if it engaged in a "commercial activity" in this country. Since
the evidence indicated that Banco Central used the C&S account for a
number of commercial purposes,70 the Sanchez court properly found
Banco Central subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts.
The legislative history of section 1605(a)(3), however, states that the
section deals only with the issue of immunity and in no way affects the
applicability of the "act of state" doctrine.71 The "act of state" doctrine
prohibits inquiry by an American court into the propriety of governmental acts committed by a foreign sovereign within its own territory. The
doctrine does not, however, extend to confiscation of property within the
United States. Since Sanchez asserted that the wrongfully confiscated
property was in the C&S account, the court in Sanchez reasoned that the
act of state doctrine was inapplicable72 and jurisdiction was properly
asserted.
Jurisdiction under the last exception, section 1605(a)(5), may be exercised over cases involving tortious conduct which causes "personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property occurring in the United
States. 7 3 Among Sanchez' claims against Banco Central were misrepresentation and conversion. While section 1605(a)(5)(B) expressly exempts
misrepresentation from torts actionable under this section, the claim of
74
conversion is allowed.
Banco Central contended that section 1605(a)(5) should be limited
to torts which result in casualty-type damages and that the tort of conversion, which does not result in physical harm to persons or property,
falls outside the exception in the Act. The court in Sanchez properly rejected this argument.
69 515 F. Supp. at 910.
70 The evidence showed that Banco Central used the C&S account to pay for letters of
credit issued through C&S, to pay interest and principal on loans to Banco Central made by
C&S, to collect all American checks tendered to Banco Central, and to pay the expenses of
Nicaraguan students in the U.S. Id. at 906-07, 910-11.
71 House Report, supra note I, at 20 & n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6618-19 & n.l.
72 515 F. Supp. at 910 n.10.
73 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976). Two types of
exceptions are identified: claims based on performance or omissions of governmental discretionary functions, and defamation and misrepresentation claims. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A), (B).
74 515 F. Supp. at 912-13.
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument in
Letelier v. Repubhc of Chile75 in which the defendants argued that
1605(a)(5) should be limited to "private" torts. There, the defendants,
the Republic of Chile and members of the Chilean Intelligence forces,
were allegedly responsible for the deaths of the Chilean diplomatic officials in the District of Columbia which occurred when a bomb destroyed
the car in which they were riding. The defendants asserted that a tort of
a governmental nature, such as an assassination, was outside the scope of
this section. The court held that the Act does not seek to limit which
torts the section applies to. 7 6 In fact, the legislative history makes it clear
that, although directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents, the
section is cast in "general terms as applying to all tort actions7 7for money
damages, not otherwise encompassed by section 1605(a)(2)."
Sanchez is further supported by the fact that subsection (B) of section
1605(a) (5) expressly excludes a number of torts which do not cause "casualty-type" damages. 78 If Banco Central's argument were correct, then
it would have been unnecessary for Congress to exclude only certain noncasualty type torts. As Sanchez correctly reasons, "The fact that Congress
deemed it necessary to exclude certain non-casualty torts, but not all
the scope of the general exemption
such torts like conversion, indicates
' 79
created by section 1605(a)(5).
The Sanchez court, therefore, was able to assert jurisdiction over the
governmental acts of a foreign entity under sections 1605(a)(3) and
1605(a)(5). This fact illustrates the difference between the FSIA and the
restrictive theory.8 0 In a pre-FSIA decision, a determination by the State
Department that the acts at issue were governmental in nature would
have disposed of the issue and the foreign entity would be granted immunity. Under the particular facts before the court in Sanchez, however, the
finding that the acts were governmental in nature did not result in a
similar grant of immunity, but rather, by the very terms of the FSIA,
these governmental acts were acts for which a foreign state is not
immune.
Since the legislature expressly intended that the FSIA codify the restrictive theory, the Sanchez court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether
the Act could be read as granting jurisdiction over an act for which the
75 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). See also Note, The Letelier Case: Foreign Sovereign
Liability for Acts of Political Assassination, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. 251 (1981).
76 Id. at 671-73. Judgment was later entered against the defendants, including the Republic of Chile, in an amount in excess of $5,000,000. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F.
Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
77 House Report, supra note 1, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6619 (emphasis added).
78 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) (1976) expressly
excludes: "any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."
79 515 F. Supp. at 913.
80 House Report, supra note 1, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
6605.
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foreign state would have been immune under the restrictive theory. The
court found that the words of the statute controlled. The legislative history, in discussing the requisite evidence needed to support a grant of
immunity, states that the defendant must show "that the plaintiff's claim
relates to a public act of the foreign state--hat is, an act not within the
exceptions in sections 1605-1607."83i The logical conclusion is that the term
"public act", an act for which immunity will be granted, is not synony,
mous with the term "governmental act" and therefore, certain situations
will arise where an act will be governmental and yet still under the jurisdiction of the FSIA. Such an act was found in Sanchez.
Support for the exercise ofjurisdiction over the governmental acts of
a foreign state may also be implied from the fact that section 1605(a)(3)
is expressly directed at noncommercial torts. The Act clearly contemplates that American courts will exercise jurisdiction over acts that are
governmental in nature and, therefore, as the Sanchez court noted, "[T]he
FSIA goes further than the governmental/commercial dichotomy of the
'restrictive' approach. '82 Despite their governmental nature, the court
reasoned that certain acts are actionable because of their grievous nature
83
and their connection to the United States.
The decision in Sanchez is significant in two major respects. First, it
provides further judicial interpretations of the terms "commercial" and
"governmental" as they apply under the Act, especially under the important "commercial activities exception" to sovereign immunity.8 4 The act
requires an analysis which focuses on the particular action in question
and a close examination of the facts underlying that action. The governmental or commercial character of the action itself is controlling and not
the governmental or commercial character of the foreign defendant.
Sanchez is a step toward uniformity of immunity decisions.
Second, and more importantly, Sanchez illustrates how the FSIA,
which was meant to codify the restrictive theory of immunity, extends
the jurisdiction of American courts beyond the limits imposed under the
restrictive theory. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the American
courts could not have heard a case involving the governmental acts of a
foreign state. Under the FSIA, however, governmental as well as commercial acts fall within the jurisdiction of the court.
The Sanchez decision does, however, leave an important question unanswered. Now that the American courts are empowered to decide some
cases involving the governmental acts of a foreign state, what contacts
with the United States will be necessary to meet the minimum contacts
requirement? For example, under section 1605(a)(3) (property taken in
violation of international law), an American court can decide a case in81 House Report, supra note 1, at 17, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6616.
82 515 F. Supp. at 914.
83 Id.

84 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
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volving the property owned by an agency of a foreign state so long as
that agency is engaged in a commercial act in the United States.8 5 If the
property in question is outside the United States, will the single unrelated commercial act of the foreign agency in the United States be
enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement?8 6 The answer to
this question will significantly influence the jurisdictional reaches of the
American courts over a foreign state. In Sanchez, however, the departure
from the restrictive theory is clear. No longer will immunity be granted
solely because an act is governmental in nature and no longer can the
concepts of "restrictive theory" and immunity under the FSIA be consid87
ered synonomous.
-MARK

A. BLOCK

85 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976).
86 One commentator who examined this question has concluded that more than a single,
unrelated commercial act will be required before minimum contacts is achieved, but that the
point at which such contacts are achieved is unclear under the Act. See Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 211, 255-56 (1979).
87 Assuming that Ms. Sanchez can prove her claims against Banco Central, her ability to
collect a judgment is severely impaired by the fact that property of a foreign central bank is
immune from attachment and execution. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28
U.S.C. § 1611 (b)(1) (1976).

